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We evaluated the cost-effectiveness of Struggling Schools, a user-generated approach to 
Comprehensive School Reform implemented in 100 low achieving schools serving 
disadvantaged students in a Canadian province. The results show that while Struggling Schools 
had a statistically significant positive effect on Grade 3 Reading achievement, d=.48 in 2005-06 
and .60 in 2006-07, the program was not cost-effective when compared to two alternatives:  
1. The cost of bringing one student to the provincial achievement standard was more than 25% 
higher in Struggling Schools than in the status quo.  
2. The cost-effectiveness ratio (i.e., effect size per $1,000 of incremental cost) was lower in 
Struggling Schools than in Success For All.  
Struggling Schools would have been deemed to be cost-effective if different choices had been 
made, especially in (a) the calculation of costs (e.g., the inclusion of donated time), (b) the 
decision rules for declaring cost-effectiveness, and (c) the studies used to access comparative 
data. 
 
Nous avons évalué le rapport cout-efficacité du programme Struggling Schools (écoles en 
difficulté), une approche générée par l'utilisateur à la réforme d'ensemble des écoles mise en 
œuvre dans 100 écoles peu performantes desservant des élèves défavorisés dans une province 
canadienne. Les résultats indiquent que si l'effet du programme Struggling Schools sur le 
rendement en lecture en 3e année était statistiquement significatif et positif (d= 0,48 en 2005-06 
et 0,60 en 2006-07), son rapport cout-efficacité n'était pas aussi intéressant que celui des deux 
alternatives suivantes: 
1. Le cout de rehausser le rendement d'un élève pour qu'il atteigne le standard provincial était 
plus élevé de 25% avec Struggling Schools par rapport au statut quo. 
2. Le rapport cout-efficacité (c.-à-d. l'effet par 1 000$ de cout différentiel) du programme 
Struggling Schools était plus bas que celui du programme Success for All. 
Le programme Struggling Schools aurait été jugé rentable si on avait choisi autrement, 
notamment par rapport (a) au calcul des couts (par ex. l'inclusion de la main d'œuvre à titre 
gratuit), (b) aux règlements portant sur les décisions quant aux critères de rentabilité, et (c) aux 
études employées pour accéder aux données de comparaison.  
 
 
Cost-effectiveness analysis is a particular type of cost study, defined as “the systematic approach 
of integrating information on the costs and effects of various alternatives to identify the option 
that most efficiently utilizes limited resources to produce a particular outcome or set of 
outcomes” (Rice, 1997, p. 309). Cost-effectiveness studies are particularly helpful when 
assessing program benefits (e.g., improvements in students’ ability to read) that are not easily 
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converted to monetary outcomes, such as career earnings or reduced welfare costs, a 
requirement of cost-benefit analysis. 
In this article we examine the cost-effectiveness of an approach to Comprehensive School 
Reform (CSR) that was implemented in a Canadian province. Ross, Alberg, and Nunnery (1998) 
distinguished two approaches to CSR: (a) one in which schools select from a menu of programs 
developed by external agencies, and (b) another in which schools develop a school improvement 
process using research-based principles with the support of an external agency. Struggling 
Schools was of the second type. In this article we will briefly review the program (reported in 
detail in Ross, Scott, & Sibbald, 2012) and the evidence for claims about its effects on student 
achievement. But our main focus here is the value-for-money question: Was the Struggling 
Schools program, and by extension similar programs launched by provinces and districts in 
other jurisdictions, cost-effective? We will present data on the program’s costs in relation to its 
benefits and explore alternate ways of interpreting its cost-effectiveness. 
 
The Struggling Schools Program 
 
The purpose of Struggling Schools was to increase Grades 1 to 3 Reading in low achieving 
schools; that is, those in which less than one third of its students were meeting the provincial 
standard. There was staggered entry to the program in four Phases: in 2001-02, 15 schools were 
admitted; 14 schools were admitted in each of 2002-03 and 2003-04; and 57 schools were 
admitted in the final year, 2004-05; that is, N=100 schools. Each school was admitted for four 
years: three years of intensive support followed by an exit year in which schools transitioned to 
self-support. Program actions were the following:   
 
1. The school developed an inventory of its resources;  
2. An external diagnostician with expertise in literacy instruction and school change assessed 
the school’s needs and prescribed remedies;  
3. School administrators and faculty developed a school improvement plan;  
4. The province provided funding, tied to the plan, for in-service, release time and professional 
learning materials;  
5. A provincial case manager delivered or coordinated training on literacy teaching skills and a 
leadership advisor counseled the principal on strategic planning;  
6. The school implemented its plan; and  
7. The school received feedback from the diagnostician at the end of each year on its progress.  
 
Each element of the Struggling Schools program was derived from Fullan’s (2001, 2005) 
theory of change. The causal mechanisms of Fullan’s theory most relevant to Struggling Schools 
were (a) capacity building (i.e., the acquisition of research-based teaching skills such as the 
province’s Report of the Expert Panel on Literacy in Grades 4 to 6 in Ontario (2004),  the 
creation and maintenance of a supportive organization, and transformational leadership), (b) 
partnerships with external agencies, and (c) accountability (i.e., setting school targets, 
measuring performance and identifying ameliorative strategies; Fullan & Campbell, 2007). 
We conducted a third party study of the student achievement effects of Struggling Schools 
which was a quasi-experimental, pre-post matched sample design with school as unit of 
analysis, drawing on two years of achievement data from standardized external assessments. 
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Struggling Schools had a statistically significant positive effect on Grade 3 Reading achievement; 
d=.48 in 2005-06 and d=.60 in 2006-07, effect sizes larger than those typically reported for 
well-structured CSR programs. There were no statistically significant differences attributable to 
year of program entry but there was evidence of enduring achievement effects two years after 
exit from the program (Ross et al., 2012).  
 
Determining Cost-Effectiveness 
 
Cost-effectiveness researchers compare the cost-outcome ratios of alternative ways of allocating 
resources. Although the procedures are relatively standardized in manuals such as Levin and 
McEwan (2001), each step in the process (calculation of benefits, costs and the metric for 
comparing them) involves assumptions and methodological decisions. The most important set 
of choices in our study involved the definition of program alternatives and the criteria for 
defining effectiveness. 
The practice has been to compare highly diverse interventions so long as they share similar 
objectives. For example, Levin (2009) examined the cost of five disparate programs: (a) Perry 
Preschool, (b) First Things First, (c) class size reduction, (d) Chicago child-parent centers, and 
(e) a 10% increase in teacher salaries. These were chosen because they were the only 
interventions for which there is rigorous evidence that the intervention reduced school 
dropouts. Educational economists are willing to assume that differences among studies, such as 
(a) how the outcome variable is measured, (b) the time period of the original data collection, (c) 
student samples and populations, (d) the scale of the intervention, and (e) the mechanisms of its 
operation, can be measured and controlled within the cost-effectiveness analysis. Harris (2009) 
viewed the assumption as questionable. He suggested that variability across studies of 
interventions could be resolved if researchers compared near program substitutes and created 
tables comparing interventions with similar values on each dimension of substitutability. 
Harris’s proposal is very much a long term strategy because cost studies are infrequently 
conducted in education (Hummel-Rossi & Ashdown, 2002; Levin, 2001; Levin & McEwan, 
2001; Ross, Barkaoui, & Scott, 2007).  
We addressed the problem of excessive diversity of program alternatives in two ways: (a) by 
controlling for some of the most important contextual variables that influence a program’s 
impact (i.e., a comparison to the status quo), and (b) by comparing Struggling Schools to the 
most similar program for which cost data are available. 
  
Comparison to Matched Control Schools 
 
We compared the Struggling Schools program to its nearest equivalent, schools that were highly 
similar to those receiving the intervention in terms of student characteristics, policy context, and 
funding, but differed in terms of the specific features of the intervention. In other words, we 
compared the cost-effectiveness of the program to its most available alternate, the status quo. 
Although some economists define policy alternatives to exclude the status quo, the 
organizational literature treats the status quo as a credible policy option (Boyle, DuBose, 
Ellingson, Guinn, & McCurdy, 2001). The schools to which Struggling Schools were compared 
constituted a near-treatment group. They were teaching Reading in Grades 1 to 3, attempting to 
implement the same instructional strategies described in the Report of the Expert Panel on 
Literacy (2004) that were the focus of the Struggling Schools; they experienced the same 
accountability pressures in response to similarly low achievement.  
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Comparison to Success For All 
 
We located three studies that examined the cost-effectiveness of CSR. Borman and Hewes 
(2002) found that Success for All students had better achievement outcomes, fewer special 
education placements and less frequent retention in grade, at a cost that was essentially the 
same as that of a control group. Borman and Hewes represented the cost-effectiveness of 
Success For All as effect size per $1,000 of annual per pupil expenditures, finding that Success 
For All was more cost effective than three alternatives (class size reduction, Perry Preschool, and 
Abecedarian Preschool) for which there are cost-benefit data.  
Yeh (2007) compared the cost-effectiveness of a commercial Reading assessment program to 
four school improvement policies (a 10% increase in educational spending, voucher programs, 
charter schools and external accountability). Yeh represented cost-effectiveness as the ratio of 
effect size divided by cost, finding that the Reading assessment program was dramatically more 
cost-effective than the alternatives.  
Creemers and van der Werf (2000) examined the cost-effectiveness of an Indonesian 
program that integrated teacher development, educational management, learning materials and 
community participation. They represented cost-effectiveness as the ratio of effect size divided 
by cost, defining a ratio of .0025 as substantial. They concluded that the program was expensive, 
requiring an increase in annual per pupil expenditures of 50% to increase student achievement 
by one standard deviation.  
Of the CSR programs for which cost-effectiveness data are available, the closest 
approximation to Struggling Schools is Success For All, one of the most extensively 
implemented and investigated CSR approaches. Rigorous evaluations of Success For All report 
statistically significant impacts on Reading skills (Borman, Hewes, Overman, & Brown, 2003; 
Borman, Slavin, Cheung, Chamberlain, Madden, & Chambers, 2007). Success For All is a whole 
school intervention that focuses on the improvement of Literacy (and to a lesser extent 
Mathematics) in Grades K to 5. The program combines (a) diagnostic assessment, (b) cross-age 
grouping, (c) Reading tutors, (d) cooperative learning, and (e) intensive instruction on discrete 
skills, supplemented by Family Support Teams to address out-of-school impediments to 
learning. Struggling Schools is similar to Success For All in that it was implemented in schools 
serving disadvantaged and underachieving student populations. Instructional interventions 
focused on the development of reading skills using evidence-based practices: diagnostic 
assessment and differentiation of instruction were core features. Struggling Schools differed 
from Success For All in that it was much less prescriptive: Success For All provides curriculum 
materials, detailed instructional techniques, and tight implementation protocols, themes that 
were absent in Struggling Schools. In addition, Struggling Schools did not provide the social 
service component found in the Family Support Teams of Success For All. The fundamental 
difference between the two interventions is that Success For All represents an externally 
developed program approach to CSR, while Struggling Schools represents a CSR approach of 
internally developed school improvement process with support from outside agencies. 
 
Criteria for Comparing Effectiveness of Program Alternatives 
 
To determine whether Struggling Schools was cost-effective, our first thought was to calculate 
the average Per Pupil Expenditure (PPE) required to bring one student in the Struggling Schools 
program to the provincial achievement standard. We could then compare the PPE cost of 
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success in Struggling Schools to the PPE cost of success in schools not participating in the 
program.  
This strategy assumed that the cost of increasing the number of students reaching the 
provincial standard is constant across all student performance levels, an assumption that is 
unlikely to be valid. Students who are advantaged by high prior achievement, positive 
dispositions toward learning and ample social capital are easier to teach than students who lack 
these advantages. It is probable that greater instructional resources would be required to bring 
underachievers to the provincial standard than is the case for students who are currently 
meeting that standard. A simple comparison of the PPE costs of successful students to status 
quo costs would be biased in favour of the status quo. We needed to adjust the comparison to 
recognize that increasing the achievement of unsuccessful students to the level reached by 
successful students increases unit costs.  
Research on mastery learning suggests that the adjustment should be quite large. For 
example, Gettinger (1985) found that some students reached mastery on a Reading task after a 
single trial; others needed 2-6 trials before they were successful and some were unsuccessful 
even after six trials. Mastery learning researchers found that even when 5-10% of the lowest 
achievers are excluded, raising the performance of the less able requires more time than 
teaching able learners. Arlin (1984) found that students who needed remediation required 36-
99% more time to achieve mastery than students who were successful on the first trial. Arlin 
found that the slowest fifth required 2-5 times as much instructional time as the fastest fifth. 
Arlin and Webster (1983) found that after eliminating 15% of students who failed to master the 
task, the slowest quartile of the remainder took more than twice as much time as the fastest 
quartile to reach mastery. The three studies in the meta-analysis of mastery learning programs 
by Kulik, Kulik, and Bangert-Drowns (1990), which did not include the Arlin (1984) or Gettinger 
(1985) studies, also found that mastery learning required additional time, as did the study by 
Martinez and Martinez (1999).  
The findings from mastery learning research demonstrate the need to adjust the comparison 
of the cost per successful student in Struggling Schools to the cost of success in control schools 
and provide some guidance about the order of magnitude. The analogy to mastery learning is 
imperfect but an adjustment of 25% would not be unreasonable; that is, the Struggling Schools 
program would be cost-effective if (a) it increased the number of students reaching the 
provincial achievement standard, and (b) it did so at a cost per successful student of no more 
than 125% of the cost per successful student of similar students in control schools.  
When considering the comparison between Struggling Schools and Success For All we found 
that although there were differences in the specific statistics of comparison, each of the studies 
of CSR cost-effectiveness reviewed above used a different version of cost per standard deviation 
of improvement to determine cost-effectiveness. We selected the metric of effect size per $1,000 
to produce this decision rule: Struggling Schools would be cost-effective if (a) it increased the 
number of students reaching the provincial achievement standard, and (b) it did so at an effect 
size cost per $1,000 no greater than Success For All. 
 
Research Questions 
 
The province sought an external agency to assess Struggling Schools because it wanted to avoid 
self-interest bias. Borman et al. (2003) found that CSR programs reviewed by developers 
generated significantly higher effect sizes than programs reviewed by third parties. Our research 
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questions for the full study were:  
 
1. What were the effects of Struggling Schools on Grade 3 Reading achievement?  
2. Were the effects on Reading achievement moderated by the number of years a school was in 
the program?  
3. Was the program cost-effective?  
 
The focus of this article is Question 3. The impact of Struggling Schools on achievement will 
be briefly presented to provide the outcome data used in the cost-effectiveness analysis. The 
detailed achievement analysis is in Ross et al. (2012).  
 
Methodology 
 
The design of the study was a quasi-experimental, pre-post matched sample design with school 
as unit of analysis.  
 
Sample 
 
For each of the 100 schools participating in Struggling Schools we selected a control school that 
was not involved in the program. For each treatment school we identified all schools in the 
province that were within 0.5 SD of its prior Grade 3 Reading achievement. We selected as the 
matching control the school that was closest on a composite socio-economic status (SES) score. 
Because the assessment agency suppresses achievement data from schools with less than 15 
students in a grade, the sample reduced to 90 pairs. Compared to the 4,054 elementary schools 
in the province, the treatment schools were at the 15th percentile in average income, at the 25th 
percentile in percentage of parents with some university, and at the 85th percentile in 
proportion of Aboriginals, single parents, and unemployed.  
 
Sources of Data 
 
Achievement. Grade 3 Reading scores came from criterion referenced assessments conducted 
by an agency independent of the provincial government. Responses to 32 multiple choice and 12 
open-ended items were aggregated to produce a 0-4 global score. The measure was the 
proportion of students in each school, with no exemptions, who achieved the provincial 
standard (Level 3 or 4). The assessment agency used three procedures to ensure reliability:  
 
1. Group marking: during training, all markers scored the same student and discussed the 
results;  
2. Reinsertion: that is, a sample of papers was scored by two or more markers; and 
3. Remarking: if a marker was in the top or bottom 5% for levels awarded on a given day, that 
person's output was remarked to guard against leniency/severity differences.  
 
Year-to-year equating is done with four test booklets (each student receives one). Each year 
one test booklet is retired and another is produced.  
Socio-Economic Status. We calculated a composite SES score for each of the 4,054 
schools in the province using 14 variables in the census database and the regression formula of 
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Johnson (2005) shown in the Appendix. The SES composite was used to select the control group 
sample and was a covariate in the MANCOVA designed to reduce the disturbance of SES on the 
impact of the Struggling Schools program.  
Costs of Struggling Schools. We used a combination of budgetary and opportunity costs 
to calculate the costs of Struggling Schools. The opportunity costs were generated using the 
ingredients method (Levin & McEwan, 2001). We estimated three types of costs. First, 
personnel and facilities costs were mainly for personnel assigned to the project full time 
(leadership advisors, case managers, diagnosticians, administrative assistants), or part time 
(program manager and portions of senior staff time). We used the mid-point of the salary range 
for each position X percentage time allocated to the program. We included the costs of benefits 
(22.3%) on salaries and the market costs for Ministry facilities (rooms for meetings held at 
Ministry offices). Costs for senior Ministry staff (manager, coordinators and education officers) 
were calculated at $155 per hour; costs for other Ministry personnel were calculated at $43.90 
per hour. The cost of facilities was less than 1% of the total cost because most of the meetings 
were held at schools. Ministry conference rooms were calculated at $275 per day, the mid-point 
($200-350) for conference room rentals in major hotels in the provincial capital. Following 
Levin and McEwan (2001) we did not include facilities costs for events hosted at schools 
because the cost of these rooms were included in the basic Per Pupil Expenditures for all 
provincial schools. Consumables (office supplies, resource materials), technology requirements, 
and travel costs (mileage, airfares, hotel and meal allowances) were based on Ministry records 
and staff estimates. We estimated the costs of Steering Committee personnel based on per diem 
rates paid by the Ministry: $600 per day for managers and $250 per day for non-managers. In 
addition to these operational costs there were expenses for monitoring the program, including 
formal evaluations contracted with outside agencies.  
Second, grants to schools were measured using Ministry records of direct payments to 
schools for teacher release time, leadership training, professional learning materials and student 
resources. Although some educational economists are reluctant to use expenditure statements to 
calculate program costs, some high quality studies such as McEwan and Carnoy (2000) do so. 
Objections to including budgetary allocations when estimating costs include (a) costs for a 
specific program are embedded in the costs of a larger unit of operation and are difficult to 
disentangle (Levin & McEwan, 2001); (b) expenditures may underestimate costs if the program 
shifts costs from paid staff to unpaid volunteers (such as parents, as in King, 1994); and (c) 
expenditures may over-estimate costs if a capital cost is assigned to a single year when the 
facility will be used for many years (Harris, 2009). None of these conditions applied in our 
study: 
  
1. Grants to schools were clearly distinguished from other Ministry operations and schools 
were visited at least monthly to ensure that the funds were expended for program purposes.  
2. The opportunity costs of donated time were calculated and included in the costs of the 
program.  
3. Capital costs (including professional learning materials for teachers that could be used 
beyond the life of the project) were negligible.  
 
Third, we included estimates of unfunded school costs; that is, the market value of donated 
time. Program implementation created additional, uncompensated workload for teachers (eight 
hours per week in the first two years and two hours per week in the third year) and principals 
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(24 hours per month, each year), estimated at $200 per day for teachers and $250 for 
principals. Costs for teachers were calculated using supply teacher (replacement) rates. Benefits 
for teachers and principals were not added because these costs were included in the PPE for 
elementary schools. Student time was not included as a cost. School costs were obtained through 
interviews with teachers and principals in case study schools. We converted all costs to 2006 
constant dollars using the Bank of Canada inflation calculator; the exchange rate in 2006 was 
CAN$1.00=US$0.85. 
Control group school costs were the average Per Pupil Expenditures for elementary schools 
in the province, which was the sum of a foundation grant, special purposes grants, and pupil 
accommodation grants. The Ministry provided the PPE for 2005-06 and we inflated the PPE for 
2006-07 by 2.41%. We calculated the cost of the Struggling Schools program as control group 
PPE per year + marginal program costs. 
At the time of the study there was very little between-school variation in PPE. There was a 
learning opportunities grant to enable school districts to provide programs for low achieving 
students. The grant was based on socio-economic factors from Statistics Canada (the exact 
formula is not published but it is based on predictors of academic difficulty: proportion of 
residents in the district who are low income, low education, recent immigrants, and 
Aboriginals). The size of the grant varied from 0.47% to 5.5% of a district’s total budget. Since 
the treatment and comparison schools were not significantly different on SES profile, the PPEs 
for their districts would have been increased by the learning opportunities grant by similar 
percentages. But the grant is awarded to the district, not the school. And although districts are 
audited for compliance with provincial regulations, they are not required to direct the funds 
from the learning opportunities grant to the schools with the greatest proportion of at-risk 
pupils. Given these conditions, we assumed that if there were learning opportunities grant 
differences between treatment and control group schools, they were small and ignorable. 
Costs of Success For All. Cost data for Success For All were drawn from the analysis of 
costs in five Baltimore Elementary schools provided by Borman and Hewes (2002). Four 
components were summed:  
 
1. The Ingredients Model was used to estimate marginal costs. The Success For All Foundation 
identified the ingredients in the program and provided standard estimates of salary and 
benefits for reading tutors, family support staff, and in-school program facilitators, to which 
were added training, implementation, and curriculum materials costs. These costs were 
estimated for each school (three of the five schools did not hire Family Support staff) and 
aggregated across schools and eight years of the program.  
2. Per Pupil Expenditures based on the annual current expenditures per pupil for all American 
schools for the 1999-2000 school year.  
3. An estimate of the market value of special education services was based on 1985-86 data for 
non-severe handicaps.  
4. The cost of retention in grade was based on the average PPE for Success For All schools and 
discounted by 5% for control group schools.  
 
In calculating effect size per $1,000 of program cost, Borman and Hewes (2002) included 
only (1.) the marginal costs, adjusted by (3.) the cost of special education services and (4.) the 
cost of retention in grade. The annual PPE of Success For All was multiplied by the average 
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number of years students were in the program. This procedure omitted (2.) the annual current 
PPE for all schools: cost-effectiveness was defined as effect size per $1,000 of incremental cost. 
In comparing Struggling Schools to Success For All we followed the same procedure except that 
we did not include the cost of special education services or the cost of grade retention. We 
omitted these because they are not an integral part of Success For All (see Borman & Hewes, 
2002, footnote 8) and represented only 1.7% of the total program cost. In addition, for 
Struggling Schools, special education costs were embedded within the annual PPE grants to 
schools and retention in grade was virtually zero because it was and is strongly discouraged by 
the province.  
 
Analysis 
 
The procedure for matching schools was successful. There were no statistically significant 
differences between treatment and control groups on prior achievement [F(1,178)=.414, p=.521] 
or Socio-Economic Status composite score [F(1,178)=.283, p=.596]. There were also no 
significant treatment-control differences on prior achievement or SES for each of the four 
subgroups (not tabled). We conducted a multivariate analysis of covariance using General 
Linear Modeling (GLM). The dependent variables were Grade 3 Reading scores in 2005-06 and 
2006-07. The covariates were (a) prior achievement in Grade 3 Reading and (b) school SES. The 
independent variables were (a) group (treatment or control), (b) program Phase (years in the 
program), and (c) the group X Phase interaction. This design had adequate statistical power for 
determining whether there was an overall effect of the Struggling Schools program. With a 
sample size of 180, we were able to detect a program effect as small as ES=.17 with 80% power at 
p<.05 (Dennis, 1994). However, comparisons between cohorts were underpowered because of 
small cell sizes.  
Our source for the effectiveness of Success For All was the quasi-experiment reported by 
Borman and Hewes (2002). Volunteer schools were matched on demographic variables with 
control schools. Student outcomes were scores on standardized measures of Grade 8 Reading 
skills, adjusted by SES and Kindergarten achievement, using multi-level modeling. 
To determine cost-effectiveness we calculated the benefits and costs of each phase of the 
Struggling Schools program and its control group. For each group of schools we calculated the 
average increase in PPE required to bring one student to the provincial achievement standard, 
that is, we divided the annual PPE by the adjusted mean achievement level.  
Our first decision rule was that Struggling Schools was cost-effective if it increased the 
number of students reaching the provincial achievement standard and did so at a cost per 
successful student that was no more than 25% greater than the cost per successful student in the 
control. We conducted sensitivity analysis by varying our estimates of costs (by deleting donated 
time) and benefits (by raising the effect of the program from the mean to the upper bound of the 
95% confidence level). We also calculated the cost-effectiveness of the Struggling Schools 
program in comparison to Success For All by converting the marginal cost of Struggling Schools 
over four years of funding to 2,000 US$ (1 US$=0.67 $CAN in 2000; 2000-2006 inflation 
rate=11.4%) and dividing the total incremental cost of Struggling Schools by its effect size. This 
enabled us to compare the effect size per $1,000 of Struggling Schools to the effect size per 
$1,000 for Success For All reported in Borman and Hewes (2002). 
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Results  
 
Achievement Effects of Struggling Schools 
 
Table 1 shows the effect sizes, with bias correction for small samples (Hedges & Olkin, 1985), 
and the lower and upper bounds of the effect sizes (95% confidence level). The table also shows 
how long each cohort was in the program at the time of the data collection. There was a 
statistically significant program effect when all Phases were aggregated; there was no significant 
Phase or Phase X Treatment effect. Details of the MANCOVA and other procedures are reported 
in Ross et al. (2012). The effect size of the program improved slightly, from d=.48 in 2005-06 to 
d=.60 in 2006-07. But the larger effect size was the result of a smaller pooled standard deviation 
in 2006-07 (.13) than in 2005-06 (.17). Overall there was no improvement in the mean 
achievement score of either treatment or control group schools from 2005-06 to 2006-07. Table 
1 suggests the effect of the program was highest in the third program year, declined through the 
exit year, and was still positive two years from exit. 
 
Cost-effectiveness of Struggling Schools 
 
Table 2 summarizes the costs of the program in constant 2006 dollars for the schools in each 
Phase of the program, by academic year. Grants to schools are funds transferred to implement 
school improvement plans. For schools in Phases 1, 2, and 3 the grants were approximately 
$300,000 (in nominal dollars), varying by school size, across the three years of the program. 
Table 1 
 
2005-06 and 2006-07 Unadjusted Grade 3 Reading Achievement Means 
and Standard Deviations, by Group and Year in Program* 
 
 Treatment Schools Control Schools ES Confidence Interval 
 N Mean SD N Mean SD ES Lower Upper 
2005-06 Reading 
Phase 1 (exit year + 1) 14 .50 .17 14 .45 .18 .28 -.47 1.02 
Phase 2 (exit year) 13 .48 .16 13 .44 .15 .25 -.52 1.02 
Phase 3 (year 3) 11 .62 .22 11 .48 .11 .77 -.09 1.64 
Phase 4 (year 2) 52 .54 .17 52 .47 .16 .42 .03 .81 
All Phases 90 .54 .18 90 .46 .15 .48 .18 .78 
2006-07 Reading 
Phase 1 (exit year + 2) 14 .50 .16 14 .47 .17 .18 -.57 .92 
Phase 2 (exit year + 1) 13 .47 .21 13 .43 .12 .23 -.54 1.00 
Phase 3 (exit year) 11 .56 .18 11 .49 .20 .35 -.49 1.20 
Phase 4 (year 3) 52 .56 .17 52 .45 .16 .66 .27 1.06 
All Phases 90 .54 .10 90 .46 .16 .60 .30 .90 
Note. * From Ross et al. (2012) 
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For schools in Phase 4, the grants were reduced to approximately $200,000 (in nominal dollars) 
and the distribution of funds was 52%, 24%, and 24% across the three years, rather than the 
one-third distribution per year for Phases 1 to 3. Schools in their fourth (exit) year received no 
grants and no teacher time was charged; personnel and facilities costs continued because the 
schools continued to interact with program staff. Cumulative total costs for 2000-2006 and 
2000-2007 are shown by Phase in the last two rows.  
Table 3 summarizes the annual PPE per successful student in program and control schools, 
calculated by dividing the PPE for the group (treatment or control) by its achievement mean. 
For example, for Phase 1 Treatment schools, the total cost over four years of the program, 
$10,367,812 (from Table 2) was divided by the number of pupils receiving the program (1.5 
classes x 30 students x 15 schools) and by the number of years in the program (4); these total 
Table 2 
 
Summary of Program Ingredients and Costs in 2006 Dollars, by Year and Phase 
 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
Personnel & Facilities 
2000–01  $32,618  $30,443  $30,443  $123,947  
2001–02  $439,055  $0  $0  $0  
2002–03 $543,328  $507,596  $0  $0  
2003–04  $1,133,657  $1,057,322  $1,057,322  $0  
2004 -05  $503,324  $469,769  $469,769  $1,912,632  
2005–06  $0  $469,769  $469,769  $1,912,632  
2006–07  $0  $0  $469,769  $1,912,632  
Unfunded School Costs 
2000–01  $0  $0  $0  $0  
2001–02  $1,065,787  $0  $0  $0  
2002–03 $1,049,244  $979,294  $0  $0  
2003–04  $346,837  $956,088  $956,088  $0  
2004 -05  $340,062  $317,391  $937,411  $3,816,603  
2005–06  $0  $313,040  $313,040  $3,764,280  
2006–07  $0  $0  $313,040  $1,274,520  
Grants to Schools 
2000–01  $0  $0  $0  $0  
2001–02  $2,882,982  $0  $0  $0  
2002–03 $1,027,636  $2,566,407  $0  $0  
2003–04  $1,003,284  $907,197  $2,421,229  $0  
2004 -05  $0  $889,476  $859,527  $6,613,743  
2005–06  $0  $0  $847,744  $2,361,802  
2006–07  $0  $0  $0  $2,361,802  
Cumulative Total Cost 
2000-06 $10,367,812  $9,463,791  $8,362,342  $20,505,639  
2000-07 $10,367,812  $9,463,791  $9,145,151  $26,054,593  
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marginal costs of the program, $10,367,812/(1.5 * 30 *1.5 * 4)=$3839.93, were added to the 
average cost of elementary schools in the province not receiving the program; that is, $3,839.93 
+ $8,193=$12,032.93. The achievement means were adjusted by prior school achievement and 
composite school SES. In six of the eight comparisons, the annual PPE per successful student 
was more than 25% higher for schools in the Struggling Schools program than for control 
schools. Averaging across phases, the PPE per successful student was 36% higher in 2005-06 
and 26% higher in 2006-07 than in the control schools. Struggling Schools did not meet our first 
criterion for cost-effectiveness. 
In Table 4 we report the results of a sensitivity analysis in which we varied our assumptions 
about costs and benefits. First, we created lower cost estimates by removing donated time (i.e., 
additional teacher and principal time required by program implementation). The fourth column 
of Table 4 shows that in all but one of the eight comparisons the annual PPE per successful 
student of Struggling Schools was less than 25% more than in the control schools. The sixth 
column of Table 4 shows the results when we used the upper bound of the adjusted achievement 
means from the MANCOVA and the lower estimate of program costs. In all of the eight 
comparisons the Struggling Schools program was less than 25% more costly than the status quo. 
The sensitivity analysis suggests that we should be more cautious in our initial claim that 
Struggling Schools was not cost-effective. Changing assumptions behind the calculation of costs 
and benefits supports the claim that Struggling Schools was cost-effective. 
Table 3 
 
Cost of Reaching the Provincial Achievement Standard in Treatment  
and Control Schools by Phase, for 2005-06 and 2006-07 
 
 Control Schools Treatment Schools 
 Annual PPE 
Adjusted 
Achieve-
ment * 
Annual  
PPE per 
Successful 
Student Annual PPE 
Adjusted 
Achieve-
ment * 
Annual  
PPE per 
Successful 
Student 
2005-06 Results (in 2006 dollars) 
Phase 1 $8,193 .45 $18,207 $12,033 .52 $23,140 
Phase 2 $8,193 .48 $17,069 $12,887 .52 $24,783 
Phase 3 $8,193 .49 $16,720 $13,724 .62 $22,135 
Phase 4 $8,193 .45 $18,207 $13,765 .54 $25,491 
2006-07 Results (in 2006 dollars) 
Phase 1 $8,390 .46 $18,239 $11,590 .56 $20,696 
Phase 2 $8,390 .46 $18,239 $12,145 .51 $23,814 
Phase 3 $8,390 .52 $16,135 $12,926 .57 $22,677 
Phase 4 $8,390 .43 $19,512 $12,622 .55 $22,949 
 
Note. PPE=Per Pupil Expenditures over the three years of the program. 
* Mean achievement scores were adjusted by school prior achievement and school SES 
composite. The covariates were evaluated at prior achievement=.2787 and SES=10.0827 in 
the formula: post achievement = intercept + group * phase + group + phase + prior 
achievement + SES. 
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Finally, in Table 5 we summed the total increase in per pupil expenditures across the four 
years that schools were in the Struggling Schools program, converting the totals to 2,000 US$. 
We extrapolated the exit year costs for Phase 4 schools from Phase 3 schools data. We calculated 
the 2005-06 and 2006-07 effect size per $1,000 of Struggling Schools funding and compared 
this effectiveness-cost ratio to the same ratio for Success For All schools, based on students 
being in Success For All for an average of 3.84 years. The overall ratio for Struggling Schools was 
0.06 in 2005-06 and 0.07 in 2006-07, compared to 0.09 for Success For All. In terms of our 
second criterion, Struggling Schools program was not cost-effective. 
 
Discussion  
 
We developed two standards for determining whether Struggling Schools was cost-effective. 
First, we compared the program’s cost-effectiveness to that of control schools: The Struggling 
Schools program would be cost-effective if (a) it increased the number of students reaching the 
provincial achievement standard, and (b) did so at a cost per successful student of no more than 
125% of the cost per successful student of similar students in control schools. The program met 
part (a) but not part (b). Second, we compared the program’s cost-effectiveness to Success For 
All, an externally developed CSR programs with similar objectives: The Struggling Schools 
program would be cost-effective if (a) it increased the number of students reaching the 
provincial achievement standard, and (b) did so at a ratio of effect size cost per $1,000 of 
increased PPE that was no greater than the same ratio for Success For All. Again, the program 
met part (a) but not part (b). We conclude, reluctantly and cautiously, that Struggling Schools 
was not cost-effective. 
Table 4 
 
Per Pupil Expenditures per Successful Student in Program and Control,  
Assuming Lower Cost and Assuming Lower Cost and Higher Benefit, by Phase 
 
Program Phase 
Annual PPE per Successful Student 
 Lower Cost Lower Cost/Higher Benefit 
Control PPE % Above PPE % Above 
2005-06 Results      
Phase 1 (exit year + 1) $18,207 $21,144 16% $18,325 <1% 
Phase 2 (exit year) $17,069 $22,336 31% $19,040 12% 
Phase 3 (year 3) $16,720 $19,781 18% $17,033 2% 
Phase 4 (year 2) $18,207 $22,070 21% $20,548 13% 
2006-07 Results      
Phase 1 (exit year + 2) $18,239 $19,152 5% $16,758 -8% 
Phase 2 (exit year + 1) $18,239 $21,818 20% $18,859 3% 
Phase 3 (exit year) $16,135 $20,484 3% $17,691 10% 
Phase 4 (year 3) $19,512 $20,335 10% $18,955 -3% 
Note. PPE=Per Pupil Expenditures over the three years of the program. 
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Comparisons of Struggling Schools to Control Schools 
 
In our sensitivity analysis we found that Struggling Schools would have reached our first cost-
effectiveness criterion if donated time of teachers and administrators had been excluded from 
cost calculations. The issue is controversial. The costs of school improvement: (a) are typically 
borne by school staff, (b) are frequently unrecognized by policy makers, and (c) are difficult to 
measure. Slavin and Madden (2003) argued that “most Success For All schools never have 
received funds beyond their usual Title I allocations, so in one sense the program has no 
incremental costs” (p. 4), an argument that could be applied to the donated time required to 
implement Struggling Schools. Among economists, Levin (2002) argued that when assessing 
costs in CSR programs donated ingredients should be included because it does not matter who 
provides the resources: they are still costs. Harris (2009) concurred, suggesting that the 
distribution of costs among stakeholders is unimportant because these will be negotiated 
through political bargaining. In contrast, King (1994) argued that donated time could be 
considered cost-free if it is readily available. She suggested that in a community that provides 
high levels of donated personnel time, Success For All is inefficient because it replaces donated 
Table 5 
 
Marginal Per Pupil Expenditures of Struggling Schools  
and Success For All, in 2,000 US$ 
 
CSR Program Marginal PPE Reading ES ES per $1,000 
Struggling Schools 2005-06 
Phase 1 $11,379 0.28 0.03 
Phase 2 $11,129 0.25 0.02 
Phase 3 $9,834 0.77 0.08 
Phase 4 $5,923 0.42 0.07 
All Phases $8,018 0.48 0.06 
Struggling Schools 2006-07 
Phase 1 $11,379 0.18 0.02 
Phase 2 $11,129 0.23 0.02 
Phase 3 $10,754 0.35 0.03 
Phase 4 $7,525 0.66 0.09 
All Phases $9,060 0.60 0.07 
Other CSR Program 
Success For All $3,054 0.29 0.09 
Note. PPE = Per Pupil Expenditures over the four years of the program for Struggling Schools 
and over 3.84 years for Success For All.  
ES = Effect Size. 
Success For All data from Borman & Hewes (2002). 
 
Cost-Effectiveness of Comprehensive School Reform in Low Achieving Schools 
 
 
 153 
time with paid staff. The cost of Struggling Schools, with regard to donated time, is not fixed: 
This component may be a large or small addition to the incremental cost of the program, 
depending upon the culture of the school. In addition, the willingness of staff to donate time is 
likely to be a function of their commitment to school improvement. Since donated time made 
the difference between meeting or not meeting our first decision rule, investigation of the 
typicality of the donated time estimates provided by teachers and students in our case studies is 
warranted. 
Our first decision rule recognized that to raise the number of students meeting proficiency 
standards becomes increasingly challenging as one moves to lower levels of the student ability 
pool. The relationship between cost and success is non-linear; that is, there is a threshold of 
minimal resources required for even the most able learners, a steady increase in resources to 
meet students of increasing challenge, and ceiling effects when further resources fail to 
contribute to more students reaching proficiency. We drew upon mastery learning research to 
suggest that raising the performance of the harder-to-educate group should not be more than 
25% of the costs of success in control schools. But the analogy to mastery learning is imperfect: 
The assessments were aligned to the province’s curriculum objectives which emphasized 
Reading comprehension as well as mastery of discrete skills.  
 
Comparison of Struggling Schools to Success For All 
 
Our second decision rule involved a comparison to one of the most extensively investigated CSR 
programs, Success For All. Struggling Schools cost estimates included costs of program 
development, for example, costs incurred before schools were identified. In contrast, the cost-
effectiveness calculations for Success For All were based solely on delivery costs after the 
program had been fully developed and extensively field tested. During the roll out of Struggling 
Schools, a major portion of its costs (grants to schools) were reduced substantially for the last 
cohort of schools (Phase 4) with no loss of achievement benefits and the costs of program 
management were distributed across more schools than in Phases 1 to 3. Struggling Schools was 
becoming more cost-effective as it was scaled up. But, in the user-generated approach to CSR, 
the processes of school improvement have to be enacted anew in each school. What is exported 
to new sites is not the products of innovation but the innovation process (Fullan, 1999). CSR 
approaches in which schools select from a menu of previously tested options are inherently 
more cost-effective than user-generated programs developed from school improvement 
principles.  
Cost-effectiveness is dependent in part on how outcomes are calculated. In Struggling 
Schools student outcomes were aggregated to the school level by the provincial assessment 
agency whereas in Success For All, achievement was reported at the individual student level. 
Since differences between-schools are usually smaller than differences within-schools, the 
pooled standard deviation will be smaller at the school level and the effect sizes will be larger 
(Hall, Tickle-Degnen, Rosenthal, & Mosteller, 1994). The cost-effectiveness advantage of 
Success For All over Struggling Schools was likely greater than we detected.  
The impact of programs varies from one site to another. Borman and Hewes (2002) found 
an effect size d=.29 for Success For All in five Baltimore schools, which was 60% higher than the 
d=.18 for the 42 Success For All studies in Borman et al. (2003) and 260% higher than the 
d=.08 reported in the same meta-analysis for Success For All studies conducted by third-party 
evaluators. In contrast, Slavin and Madden (2000) reported d=.39-.62 for studies of Success For 
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All conducted from 1988 to 1999. Since Success for All is highly standardized, cost data could be 
estimated for these outcome studies, producing a less precise but reasonable accurate cost 
estimate. But the cost-effectiveness ratio would vary in response to fluctuations in effect sizes. 
Whether Struggling Schools was deemed to be cost-effective could depend upon which Success 
For All study it was compared to.  
This problem is not limited to comparisons to Success For All. For example, the Tennessee 
Student/Teacher Achievement Ratio (STAR) Experiment, widely recognized as “one of the great 
experiments in education in U.S. history” (Mosteller, Light, & Sachs, 1996, p. 814), provides the 
data on which most claims about the cost-effectiveness of class size reductions are based 
(Borman et al., 2005; Borman et al., 2007; Harris, 2009; Krueger, 2003; Levin, 2009; Yeh, 
2007). But the effects of class size on achievement are highly variable. Much lower estimates of 
the effects of class size reduction were reported by Stecher, Bohrnstedt, Kirst, McRobbie, and 
Williams (2001) for California, and Hruz (2000) for Wyoming. It may be that so few evaluations 
of CSR programs contain sufficient cost data to make cost-effectiveness comparisons that the 
bar is set very high. 
Only student achievement was included in determining the cost-effectiveness of Struggling 
Schools and the CSR program to which it was compared. There was no consideration of teacher 
capacity impacts (such as increased use of evidence-based instructional skills and improvements 
in teacher efficacy) or organizational capacity effects (such as the strengthening of professional 
communities and movement toward distributed or transformational leadership strategies 
associated with school improvement (as found by Ross & Gray, 2006; Ylimaki, Jacobson, & 
Drysdale, 2007). Although the ultimate criterion of school success is student achievement, the 
user-generated approach to CSR assumes that achievement will improve in the long run if the 
meditational effects of teacher and organizational capacity enhancements are included in the 
assessment model.1  
 
Directions for Future Research 
 
In 2006-07 the Struggling Schools program was renamed, restructured to lower costs, and 
scaled up to 800 schools. In 2007-08 and in 2008-09, the principles embedded in the 
Struggling Schools program were incorporated into a school improvement process rolled out to 
all schools in the province. These successor programs are much less costly than Struggling 
Schools but their benefits are unknown. Research is needed to determine whether the effect 
sizes for the original Struggling Schools program are sustained in the scaled up versions.  
More generally there is a need for more research on the cost of CSR programs. Most CSR 
researchers are focused solely on program benefits, that is, whether the program generated a 
statistically significant effect of meaningful size. But policy makers and administrators 
constantly ask the value-for-money question. When considering alternative ways of addressing 
school needs, they make cost-effectiveness judgments with little to go on beyond their intuitions. 
Cost-effectiveness studies need to be completed and reported in evidence banks such as the 
Institute of Education Sciences, What Works Clearinghouse at http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/ 
and the Best Evidence Encyclopedia, Empowering Educators with Evidence on Proven 
Programs at http://www.bestevidence.org 
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Conclusion 
 
Our study of the cost-effectiveness of Struggling Schools makes several contributions to 
Comprehensive School Reform research. First, it is a fresh case. There are very few studies of the 
cost-effectiveness of CSR and virtually all draw upon secondary sources rather than collecting 
new data. In addition, the Struggling Schools program is typical of CSR programs developed to 
increase the capacity of low achieving schools serving disadvantaged populations. The principles 
embedded in Struggling Schools’ program theory and the structures and processes created to 
build school capacity are similar to those put in place in countless jurisdictions. The study found 
that the approach to CSR represented by Struggling Schools made a statistically significant 
contribution to student achievement of moderate effect size, confirming the worth of such 
programs. The distinctive finding of our study is that the cost of doing so was high. The program 
was not cost-effective when compared to the status quo or to a frequently implemented 
alternative CSR program, Success For All. But our claim is offered with a serious caution: 
different choices about costs and the program to which it is compared could have led to a claim 
that Struggling Schools was cost-effective. The practical implication is that provinces and 
districts developing similar programs need to be very focused on costs, particularly when scaling 
up the innovation across a large number of schools. 
The second contribution of the study is the finding that when comparing Struggling Schools 
to other CSR programs, selecting from a menu of CSR options is likely to be more cost-effective 
than developing a new program. This finding is likely to generalize because schools that select 
from a menu of options do not bear development costs.  
The third contribution of the study is that the value-for-money question raises additional 
unresolved questions that warrant the attention of school improvement researchers. Should 
unfunded teacher and principal costs of implementation be included or should school personnel 
be expected to eat the costs because schools are expected to be continuously improving? When 
calculating the benefits of CSR, should researchers focus on achievement alone or include 
teacher and organizational learning outcomes as well? If so, how should these very different 
benefits be weighed if they cannot be transformed into monetary values?2 To which programs 
should the cost-effectiveness of particular CSR programs be compared—the status quo, the best, 
or the typical? We cannot begin to answer these questions unless researchers make the 
investigation of Comprehensive School Reform costs as important as the study of its benefits. 
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Notes 
 
1  In addition to these considerations, the comparison to Success For All was limited by two other 
issues. First, is the threat of threshold effects. Success For All is a multi-faceted intervention that is much 
more intensive than Struggling Schools. It may be that a reform needs to address student needs at 
multiple levels, including providing social support for families, in order to reach a high-level of cost-
effectiveness. Second, is that we included donated time in our calculation of the costs of Struggling 
Schools, but Borman & Hewes (2002) did not do so.  
2 There are procedures for combining multiple program outcomes into a single cost-effectiveness 
analysis. Levin & McEwan (2001) suggest several strategies based on multi-attribute utility analysis. 
These procedures require substantial additional data, that is, evidence of the effects of the program on 
other outcomes (such as impacts on instructional practices, professional learning communities and 
leadership styles) and information on the value preferences of stakeholders, quite apart from the 
challenge of assigning costs within the treatment and control to these specific benefits.  
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Appendix 
 
 
We used the regression analysis of Johnson (2005) to generate the school SES composite score. 
 
SES =  -.11X1 -.04X2  -.50X3 + .08X4 + .02X5 + .05X6 + 7.20X7 - .40X8 - .08X9 - .23X10 - .20X11 
+ .28X12 + .005X13 - .000003X14 
 
 
Where X represents the following variables in the database: 
 
X1  Percent of families with children that are single parent families 
X2   Percent with English or French as home language 
X3  Percent Aboriginal in census 
X4   Percent recent immigrants (in Canada less than 5 years) 
X5  Percent born outside Canada, United States and United Kingdom 
X6  Percent of dwellings that are detached homes 
X7   Log of Average household income 1995$ 
X8  Percent of households that moved in the last year 
X9   Percent of households that moved in the last 5 years 
X10  Unemployment rate 
X11   Percent without a secondary school diploma 
X12  Percent with some university education 
X13  Total enrolment—average over 3 years of postal code data 
X14  Total enrolment squared 
 
 
 
 
